

**STATEMENT ON REPORT ON CLAIMS OF ABUSE OF SINGLE SOURCING
METHOD IN THE
AWARD OF ROAD CONTRACTS UNDER THE BIG PUSH INITIATIVE**

The Presidency received a report dated April 1, 2026, from the Media Foundation for West Africa (MFWA) on publications by the Fourth Estate regarding claims of abuse of the single-sourcing procurement process in the award of contracts under the Big Push Initiative.

On April 2, 2026, H.E. President John Mahama referred the matter to the Senior Presidential Advisor on Governmental Affairs. The President tasked the Advisor with investigating the allegations to establish their veracity and determining the appropriate course of action.

The MFWA Report was forwarded by the Presidency to the Ministry of Roads & Highways (MRH) on April 8, 2026, for their response. The response was received at the Presidency on April 21, 2026.

The final 72-page report was submitted to the President on May 22, 2026.

In the interest of transparency and true to our commitment to accountable governance, the full 72-page report will be published tomorrow.

I would, however, proceed to give a summary of the key findings in the report and governments position which directly address the substance of the Fourth Estate's claims.

1. DETAILS OF BIG PUSH PROJECTS

The title of the of the Fourth Estate publication was “The sole-source factory”-a reference to the Ministry of Roads and Highways.

This description immediately conveys the impression that the predominant mode of contracting at the Ministry of Roads and Highways was through single-sourced contracts.

It was imperative therefore that this be investigated to ascertain its veracity.

After a careful assessment of all the facts backed by documentary evidence, the Report established that one thousand four hundred and forty-one (1,441) project contracts have been awarded by the Ministry of Roads & Highways under the current John Mahama administration, with the following breakdown -

Ghana Highways Authority	405
Department of Feeder Roads	896
Legacy Projects	23
Consolidated (Big Push) Projects	63
Main Big Push	54

Out of a total of one thousand four hundred and forty-one (1,441) projects, one thousand three hundred and one (1,301) were awarded through open or competitive tendering.

The remaining one hundred and forty (140) were awarded under the Big Push initiative.

Out of the one hundred and forty (140) Big Push projects, sixty-six (66) were awarded via single-sourcing, fifty-one (51) were awarded via restrictive tendering, and twenty-three (23) were ongoing projects inherited from the previous government that had been awarded on single-source basis and absorbed under the Big Push initiative.

The foregoing reveals that-

- 1,301 out of 1,441 contracts representing 90.28% of road contracts under this government were awarded through the open/competitive tendering process;
- Only 4.58% of the total 1,441 road contracts awarded by the Ministry of Roads and Highways in 2025 and 2026 were awarded through the single sourcing process.
- Under the Big Push initiative, which is only one component of the total work being done by the Ministry of Roads and Highways, less than half, exactly, 47.14%, out of the 140, were awarded through the single sourcing process;

The implementing agencies of the Ministry of Roads & Highways (MRH) obtained Public Procurement Authority (PPA) Board approval to award specific Big Push projects via single sourcing or restricted tendering.

The implementing agencies for the above projects are the Ghana Highway Authority (GHA), the Department of Urban Roads (DUR) and the Department of Feeder Roads (DFR).

- Ghana Highway Authority (GHA) obtained approvals from the PPA Board for seventy-two (72) Big Push projects. Out of these 72

projects, fifty-one (51) were procured through single sourcing and twenty-one (21) through restricted tendering.

- The Department of Urban Roads (DUR) obtained approvals from PPA Board for the sixteen (16) Big Push projects. Out of these 16 projects, eleven (11) were procured through single sourcing and five (5) through restricted tendering.
- The Department of Feeder Roads (DFR) obtained approvals from PPA Board for the twenty-nine (29) Big Push projects. Out of the 29, four (4) were procured through single sourcing and twenty-five (25) through restricted tendering.
- As indicated earlier, there were twenty-three (23) legacy projects already awarded on single-source basis by the previous government that were absorbed into the big push.

Commitment Authorisation was obtained from the Ministry of Finance for one hundred and thirty-six (136) projects, but one project is yet to be awarded. The total number of projects awarded is therefore one hundred and thirty-five (135).

At the end of the procurement stage, some projects were broken down into separate lots. These awards created five (5) additional award records thus increasing the total number of awarded projects from one hundred and thirty-five (135) to one hundred and forty (140) without breaching the Commitment Authorisation ceiling.

The evidence above clearly shows that single sourcing was not the primary mechanism for general Ministry of Roads and Highways contracts.

2. Justification for the use of single source for 47.14% of the Big Push contracts

The 2024 NDC Manifesto and subsequent proclamations by His Excellency the President and the Minister for Roads and Highways have shown that the Big Push initiative was designed as a rapid or accelerated programme to resolve severe problems with critical roads and create jobs while boosting growth.

The goal clearly is to create infrastructure development at an expedited pace, not the normal pace associated with such developments.

The Report found that the Ministry's decision to single source 47.14% of the Big Push contracts was informed by urgent and compelling national considerations and primarily guided by the following strategic factors -

- Accelerated Infrastructure Delivery - a core vision to rapidly scale and modernize the national road network.
- Procurement Efficiency - comparative timeline analyses indicating that alternative bidding processes would introduce significant delays which will only serve to exacerbate the suffering of people living in communities with these roads.
- Public and National Security Urgency - heightened public outcry regarding severe road degradation, which posed direct national security vulnerabilities in critical corridors.
- Fiscal Risk Mitigation - the pressing need to hedge against market inflation and preventable project cost escalations.

Given these extraordinary operational requirements, the statistical context of the program must be evaluated objectively.

The single-source framework was applied to 47.14% of the 140 specialized Big Push contracts. Crucially, this subset represents a mere 4.58% of the total 1,441 road sector contracts awarded by the Ministry of Roads and Highways.

This demonstrates that competitive tendering remained the Ministry's overwhelming baseline norm.

Consequently, the data and basis for adopting the single source procedure refutes any claim that Ministry of Roads and Highways acted in total disregard of the President's directive on fiscal prudence, or that it violated the executive pledge to treat single sourcing strictly as a controlled exception.

The Report therefore concludes that Ministry of Roads and Highways did not breach any procurement laws by using the single source procurement process prescribed by the Public Procurement 2003 (Act 663) as amended. The Ministry followed the procedure required by law in awarding the Big Push contracts. Neither did they abuse the single source process in defiance of President John Mahama's commitment to relegate single sourced to an exception rather than the norm.

3. CONTRADICTIONARY PROJECT FIGURES

Another claim contained in the MFWA's report was that there were disparities in project figures they put out and what the figures quoted by the Ministry.

The Report concludes that seeming disparity may be due to a focus on the source of funding.

The Ministry of Roads and Highways has various sources of funding for their infrastructural projects including the Consolidated Fund, the Road Fund, Bilateral and Multilateral Funds, and Donor Funding.

The Big Push Fund was established by the Ministry of Finance in 2025 to provide dedicated financing for large-scale infrastructure projects. The Fund's primary purpose is to accommodate the significant capital requirements of the Big Push projects, which would otherwise create a fiscal imbalance within Ministry's existing budgetary framework.

Funding for the one hundred and forty (140) Big Push projects is split between the Big Push Fund and the Consolidated Fund (GoG).

Focusing on infrastructural projects funded exclusively via the Big Push Fund creates an inaccurate picture of the reality on the ground.

4. DODO PEPESU NKWANTA ROAD

On the inconsistency of figures put out about the Dodo Pepesu Nkwanta Road, the Report found that the Ministry of Finance letter dated July 11, 2025, which communicated the grant of Commitment Authorisation for the rehabilitation of the Dodo Pepesu Nkwanta (46km) road, indicated that the estimated cost was GHC 684,001,621.50.

A letter from Ghana Highways Authority dated December 31, 2025, clearly stated that the estimated cost for the rehabilitation of the Dodo Pepesu

Nkwanta road was GHC 683,902.957.69, which was lower than the amount in the Commitment Authorisation.

If the estimated cost for the road was listed or published anywhere by the Ministry of Roads and Highways as GHC804,828,456.81, this would appear to have been a genuine typographical error since the Commitment Authorisation does not allow an amount higher than GHC684,001,621.50 for payment for the rehabilitation of the Dodo Pepeso Nkwanta road.

The contract awarded to the contractor to construct that road clearly captures the contract sum as GHC 683,902.957.69.

Beyond a genuine error in stating the figure in a list of projects they published, this does not raise any issue of impropriety whatsoever

GROWTH 82 GLOBAL LIMITED

The MFWA also alleged in their report (in reference to Growth 82 Global Limited and the rehabilitation of the Dodo Pepeso Nkwanta road project) that the letter 'w' was omitted by the Ministry in the word 'Growth' making it 'Groth', to avoid public scrutiny -

The Report finds that the letter 'w' was indeed left out of the spelling of 'Growth' in the letter from Ghana Highways Authority(GHA) to PPA dated September 19, 2025, and on the Ministry's website.

However, while the company's name was misspelled in the initial correspondence from GHA to PPA, there was no evidence to back the allegation that this was a deliberate attempt to avoid public scrutiny. It is also unclear how a contractor awarded a contract which is being executed

publicly in the full glare of all who ply that road can be concealed to avoid scrutiny.

The Ministry of Roads and Highways has been advised to correct the mistake on its website and insert the letter 'w' to reflect the correct spelling of the company's name, and this has been done.

5. UNQUALIFIED CONTRACTORS

On the allegation that the contract for the Dodo Pepesu Nkwanta road rehabilitation was awarded in December 2025 to a company incorporated in January 2025, which means that the contract was awarded eleven months after incorporation, and that the company is not classified as an A1B1 contractor -

Evidence adduced showed that the company awarded the Dodo Pepesu Nkwanta road, Messrs Growth 82 Global Limited, is classified as an A1B1 contractor with Certificate Classification No 0009780.

Evidence shows that the company Growth 82 Global Limited was registered on August 18, 2020; received A3B3 certificate on September 6, 2024; received A2B2 certificate on March 19, 2025; and received A1B1 certificate on August 14, 2025.

The contract in question was signed on December 31, 2025; commencement of works on February 12, 2026; and actual commencement on March 16, 2026.

Enquiries reveal that the contractor had fully mobilised to site; completed three (3) site camps on the project corridor and had started fixing the bad sections on the corridor.

The Report further notes that the Dodo Pepesu Nkwanta contract, was awarded through restricted tendering, and not through single sourcing.

Five companies were evaluated, and one was selected to do the job.

On allegations that documents received on three (3) feeder road contracts, show that some companies presented documents that ordinarily should raise eligibility issues (Build Managers Ltd. indicated in its SSNIT clearance certificate that it had only one (1) worker; Sanam Ghana Ltd. indicated it had four (4) workers) -

Enquiries reveal that -

- Build Managers Ltd.'s SSNIT Clearance Certificate listed twenty (20) workers as of January 2025 (Certificate No. 20201157525003);
- Sanam Ghana Ltd.'s SSNIT Clearance Certificate lists twenty-five (25) workers as of April 2022 (Certificate No. 1097022);
- Sanam Ghana Ltd.'s SSNIT Clearance Certificate as of April 2026 (Certificate No. 20140023126002) indicating twenty-six (26) workers.

6. VALUE FOR MONEY

The Fourth Estate also raised issues of value for money and perceived inflation of contract sums on some projects.

On the allegation that a project like the 25km (Lot 3) of the Dualisation of the Winneba Cape Coast could cost as much as GHC154million per kilometer, the Report found as follows.

There were two lots for the Winneba Cape Coast Road. The first lot, which is 24km, has a PPA estimated cost of GHC 1,878,011,148.00. The second lot, which is 25km, has a PPA estimated cost of GHC 3,859,581,302.93.

The explanation proffered for the higher cost per kilometre of the second lot is that the two projects have different scopes of work, even though they are almost the same in length. Apart from rehabilitation of the existing carriageway, construction of a new carriageway, service roads, and footbridges, the scope of the second lot further covers three grade-separated systems, a 1,200metre viaduct over existing alignment and four long span river bridges.

This buttresses the position that road projects are not defined by length alone, as costs are significantly influenced by factors such as terrain conditions, pavement design, drainage and bridge requirements, utility relocation, and the overall scope and complexity of works.

It has also been suggested by the Fourth Estate that the reconstruction of Dodo-Pepesu Nkwanta Road will cost more than the original works done and inaugurated in 2016 and that there was something untoward about this.

It has also been suggested that the road was asphalted and President Mahama praised the quality of work done when inaugurating the road in 2016 and that this gave credence to the claims of inflation.

For the avoidance of doubt, what was done on the Dodo-Pepesu Nkwanta Road and inaugurated in 2016, was not asphaltting, it was a double bituminous sealing which to the untrained eye appears as asphalt.

The current scope of works on the road includes

- Scarification of the existing butiminous surface
- New 600mm u-drain
- New 6km Trap drain,
- natural gravel subbase
- New crashed Rock Base(200 mm thick)
- New asphaltic binder
- New asphalt concrete wearing surface
- And new road furniture

It is this expanded scope of works that accounts for the higher cost.

On the allegation that in the GHC146million 9km Apegusu-Mpakandan feeder road, GHC35.7million is allocated for the maintenance of the feeder roads headquarters, and the same maintenance of feeder roads headquarters is allocated another GHC5.2million in the contract for the upgrading of Akosombo Gyakiti Kudikope and Yeniamama to Sedom feeder roads -

The Report found that the original Apegusu Mpakadan road contract included a provisional sum of GHC30,000,000.00 for the maintenance of the Department of Feeder Road Head Office building. The original Akosombo Gyakiti Kudikope and Yeniamama to Sodom Feeder Roads contract included a provisional sum of GHC5,000,000.00 for the maintenance of Department of Feeder Roads Head Office building.

However, prior to the investigation, the Ministry of Finance had advised the Department of Feeder Roads (DFR) that some of their Big Push contract awards exceeded approved Commitment Authorisation limits.

Consequently, all DFR Big Push contracts were reviewed and adjusted to comply with these regulatory thresholds, significantly reducing the allocations previously categorized under 'General Items'.

Notably, the provisional maintenance sum for the DFR Head Office building was reduced to zero in the Apegusu Mpakadan road contract, while the allocation within the Akosombo Gyakiti Kudikope and Yeniamia Sodom feeder roads contract was reduced to GHC975,000.00.

The Report, nevertheless, emphasises that the utilisation of General Items in such road contracts is strictly subject to the prior approval and direction of the Ministry of Roads and Highways.

These funds are neither automatically applied nor used at the contractor's discretion. Instead, they are disbursed solely for Ministry-approved priorities within the road sector.

Consequently, while provision is made in the budget for general items, the Department of Feeder Roads cannot access them without explicit MRH authorisation, and every single expenditure request undergoes a strict vetting process.

On the allegation that in another feeder road contract, three (3) cross-country vehicles and two (2) pickup vehicles are to be procured -

The Report indicates that the allegation was not backed with any details of the actual road contract being referred to.

On the allegation that even though MFWA did not have copies of the Big Push contracts, reliable sources at MRH had said that amounts allocated for vehicles and other general items in bigger contracts are totally absurd –

The Report indicates that the allegation was not backed with information on who the reliable sources at the Ministry are and what bigger contracts have absurd amounts allocated for vehicles and general items.

On the allegation that while the data indicates different contractors have been awarded contracts through single sourcing, in multiple instances some individuals own multiple of the companies that have been awarded contracts –

The Report indicates that the allegation was not backed with examples of contractors or contracts.

On the allegation that the Minister indicated that some of the contracts were put into lots to allow multiple contractors to be assigned to ensure competition and efficiency but some of these road projects put into lots were given to the same contractors –

The Report indicates that the lots of the four projects listed in the allegation had indeed been given to four contractors, namely -

- Kumasi Outer Ring Road Lot 1, Lot 2 and Lot 3
All three lots were awarded to Arab Contractors Ghana Ltd.
- Sunyani Outer Ring Road Lot 1 and Lot 2
Both lots were awarded to Kofi Job Co. Ltd.
- Dualisation of Winneba-Cape Coast Road Lot 2 and Lot 3

Both lots were awarded to M.A. & Constant Co. Ltd.

- Upgrading of Saboba-Chereponi Road, Lot 1 and Lot 2

Both lots were awarded to Fuzak Co. Ltd.

However, the contention that awarding multiple lots to a single contractor escalates costs, since the contractor will bill separately for general items and preliminaries (such as site camps for supervision) on each lot instead of consolidating them, is flawed.

This logic implies that diversifying contractors across lots would reduce expenditures. If different lots are assigned to different contractors, those independent entities will not share or subsidize each other's preliminaries and general costs.

Consequently, the allegation that single-contractor multi-lot awards artificially inflate project costs does not hold.

Furthermore, awarding two contiguous lots to one contractor does not merge them into a single operational stretch. The contractor is legally and contractually obligated to execute works concurrently across both lots, which typically requires distinct personnel and machinery fleets.

Ultimately, only contractors with proven, high-tier capacity are entrusted with simultaneous multi-lot execution.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the above, the Report made the following recommendation to improve transparency, governance and financial management in the award of road contracts.

1. In accordance with the Value for Money Office Act, 2026, all public sector single source contracts above the determined threshold must go through the VfM office and obtain a Value for Money Certificate before the contract is awarded.
2. All public sector single-sourced contracts above the determined threshold must be submitted for Cabinet approval before the contract is awarded.
3. Legislation intended to tighten the discretion surrounding the award of single source contracts should be accelerated and concluded urgently by the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Justice and Attorney-General.
4. Procurement entities must, within specified time frames, publish all approved single source contracts, comprehensive financial valuations and verified ultimate beneficial owners on a centralized, open-government e-procurement portals.

On the Value for Money Office - The recently enacted Value for Money Office framework presents an important opportunity to strengthen pre-award scrutiny, accountability and public confidence in Ghana's procurement system.

The Act was passed on March 26, 2026, to provide technical oversight and ensure that major government expenditure and projects deliver maximum benefit for public funds, specifically focusing on economy, efficiency and effectiveness. It was assented to by President John Mahama on May 11, 2026.

While the Public Procurement Authority ensures procedural and legal compliance with the Public Procurement Act, the Value for Money (VfM) Office provides technical and financial scrutiny.

The VfM Office is mandated to issue a Value for Money Certificate before any public sector contract above a certain monetary threshold is awarded.

It will also conduct rigorous value for money assessments of government programmes and projects to verify that they are economically justified.

Sections 29(2)(a), 30(1) and 30(2) contain provisions about monetary thresholds to be prescribed by legislative instrument or executive instrument.

The monetary thresholds outlined in the interim executive instrument or legislative instrument above will be applicable to single source contract awards.

The Report, however, acknowledges that even though integrating the Value for Money Office Act may introduce an additional layer of administrative oversight that could decelerate the accelerated Big Push agenda, the mechanism remains vital for guaranteeing fiscal transparency.

The Report, therefore, advises that to safeguard progress, the Value for Money Office must avoid creating artificial operational bottlenecks or bureaucratic hurdles.

The pre-approval review process must remain exceptionally rigorous without becoming inefficient, ensuring that the primary justification for single sourcing - expedited project delivery within critical timelines - is not compromised.

On Legislative Reform, President John Mahama, in the 2026 State of the Nation Address (SONA), promised to bring legislation to Parliament to tighten procurement processes by allowing resort to single source procurement method only in exceptional circumstances.

In fulfillment of this promise, the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Justice & Attorney-General are in the process of finalizing draft legislation to curb administrative discretion, minimize vulnerabilities to abuse and elevate competitive bidding as the default statutory mechanism.

Crucially, this reform will concurrently streamline open and competitive tendering procedures. By eliminating systemic inefficiencies within competitive bidding, the legislation will ensure that open procurement does not cause project delays detrimental to government timelines.

On Cabinet approval - Making Cabinet approval mandatory for high value single source contracts introduces a critical layer of executive oversight to Ghana's public financial management.

To strengthen fiscal discipline, Cabinet approval should be made a mandatory prerequisite prior to the award of any single source contracts.

Contracts subject to this executive oversight must either meet the predefined financial thresholds established under the Value for Money Office Act, 2026, or fall within specific fiscal limits explicitly determined by Cabinet.

On Publication of Procurement Calendars - Adopting open-data disclosures as a permanent, systemic feature of the public procurement lifecycle is

critical to restoring public trust. Procurement agencies must, within specified time frames, publish all approved single source contracts, comprehensive financial valuations and verified ultimate beneficial owners on a centralized, open-government e-procurement portal to dismantle any perception of patronage.

8. CONCLUSION

The conclusion from the above analysis is that the Ministry of Roads & Highways (MRH) did not abuse the single source procurement process in their award of the Big Push contracts. The Ministry acted within legal provisions and bona fide boundaries regarding the Big Push contracts.

The Report, however, indicates that there seems to be a strong public aversion to single sourcing unless reserved for genuinely exceptional circumstances. Even though current legislation takes care of these sentiments by providing the exceptions when single sourcing may be applied, it would be advisable to further restrict administrative discretion in the evaluation of future single sourcing applications.

Thus, even though the Ministry of Roads and Highways acted within the existing provisions of the Public Procurement Act, 2003 (Act 663), as amended, and obtained the necessary approvals for single sourcing, public concern highlights the need for stronger institutional transparency, enhanced public disclosure and proactive independent oversight mechanisms.

The Report recognized the transparency efforts demonstrated by the Fourth Estate and the Media Foundation for West Africa (MWFA) as serving an

essential role in fostering public accountability and bringing procurement data to national attention.

The Report, concurrently, recognized the commitment of the Ministry of Roads & Highways to executing the Big Push agenda reflects a clear imperative to accelerate infrastructure development, stimulate job creation, and drive economic growth.

The Report concludes by stating that the Public Procurement Authority (PPA) Board, the Value for Money Office and Cabinet, must function in tandem to ensure that accelerated national infrastructure initiatives, such as the Big Push agenda, are executed with optimal financial scrutiny and structural integrity.